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EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, PAROL EVIDENCE, AND
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: A CALL FOR
COURTS TO USE THE REASONING OF THE
RESTATEMENTS RATHER THAN THE
RHETORIC OF COMMON LAW
David G. Epstein,* Timothy Archer,** and Shalayne Davis***

I. INTRODUCTION
From the first year of law school, law students, lawyers, and judges
encounter the terms “parol evidence,”1 “parol evidence rule,” and “ex-
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* George E. Allen Chair, University of Richmond. As the senior author, let me
make two ministerial points. First, my name appears first because I am a law
professor, and putting my name first is the kind of arbitrary, egotistical thing that law
professors do. Second, Tim and Shalayne’s names appear as authors, even though
they are law students, because they spent virtually all summer working on this article.
In light of the quality and quantity of their work, my simply acknowledging their
contribution to this article in a footnote would be a really “tacky” thing to do, even
for a law professor.
** Law student, University of Richmond Law School.
*** Law student, University of Richmond Law School.
1. In some states, they will also encounter the term “parole evidence.” E.g.,
Robledo-Soto v. United States, No. 1:11-cr-00328-LJO, 2012 WL 5396395, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 2012) (“[C]ourts apply contract principles, including the parole evidence
rule”); Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass’n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) (“Simply
stated, the [parole evidence] rule operates . . . to exclude evidence of prior or contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements.” (citing Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995))). New Mexico courts also
utilize the term “parole.” E.g., Diversified Development & Inv., Inc. v. Heil, 1995NMSC-005, ¶ 36, 119 N.M. 290, 889 P.2d 1212 (“this Court held that parole evidence
was not admissible”). Some courts use the terms “parol evidence” and “parole evidence” interchangeably. E.g., Bettis v. Hall, 852 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1334 (D. Kan. 2012)
(“Where a contract is complete and unambiguous on its face, the court must determine the parties’ intent from the four corners of the document, without regard to
extrinsic or parole evidence. Even if the parties’ interpretations of the contract differ,
the Court need not resort to parol evidence to interpret the contract meaning if the
contract is complete and unambiguous.” (footnotes omitted)); Miller v. Reminger
Co., L.P.A., No. 3:11-cv-315-CRS, 2012 WL 2050239, at *11 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2012)
(“The overarching principle suggested in Rivermont Inn, Inc. applies just as clearly to
the common law parol evidence rule as it does to the statute of frauds. Kentucky
views the parole evidence rule as a firm and well-established rule of law.” (citing
Rivermont Inn, Inc., v. Bass Hotel Resorts, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 636 (Ky. App. 2003)); cf.
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trinsic evidence.” They use and misuse these terms. For example, consider
the following questions: can parol evidence be distinguished from extrinsic evidence? Do courts distinguish between parol evidence and extrinsic
evidence when they examine questions related to the terms of a written
contract? Should courts distinguish between parol evidence and extrinsic
evidence when they examine questions related to the terms of a written
contract? Does the parol evidence rule apply to both parol evidence and
extrinsic evidence? Does the parol evidence rule govern the terms can be
added to a written contract? Does the rule apply when interpreting the
meaning of the terms in a written contract? More generally, to what extent should the trier of fact prefer the final written version of the deal
over evidence of the parties’ prior discussions, or evidence of common
understanding? What is more important—rigid rules that provide certainty, or more “liberal” rules that provide justice?2
To put these abstract questions into a practice context, consider
these hypothetical problems. Assume that Archer Building, Inc. (“AB”)
enters into a written contract with Davis Janitorial Services Corp (“DJ”)
to provide janitorial service on a daily basis for US$800 a month, paid by
the twentieth of each month.
Problem 1: AB and DJ disagree as to what time DJ can begin its
work. Their final written contract, while lengthy, does not expressly address this question. In answering this question of starting time, will/should the court consider AB’s testimony that prior
to executing the contract, AB and DJ had agreed that AB could
not begin work until after 10 p.m.? What about DJ’s evidence that
starting janitorial work at 8 a.m. is a well-known trade custom?

Problem 2: AB and DJ disagree as to the meaning of the word
“daily” in their final written contract. AB contends that daily
means “every day” and has pre-contract e-mails that support this
contention. DJ relies on trade usage to support its position that
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Scott J. Burnham, The Parol Evidence Rule: Don’t Be Afraid of the Dark, 55 MONT.
L. REV. 93, 97 n.17 (1994) (suggesting that, while both terms are used, it is erroneous
to use the term “parole”).
2. It can be argued that rigid rules provide a just result: “Strict rules satisfy those
who feel that, if you learn the rules and follow them, you should be assured that they
will be applied firmly and without exception, even if this produces a result that appears unfair in the short run. According to this view, fairness is whatever result the
rules produce, because in the long run predictability and invariance usually make for
just results.” Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 804 (2002).
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“daily” means business days, i.e., Monday through Friday. Again,
will a court consider AB’s evidence? or DJ’s evidence? Should a
court consider the evidence? Should a court distinguish between
AB’s evidence and DJ’s evidence?

In both problems, we assume that there is a final written contract. This is
often a hotly contested issue.3 (To assume what is often a hotly contested
issue is one of the wonderful luxuries of law school and law review articles in particular.) Problem 1 involves contract supplementation. AB and
DJ are asking the court to add a time of performance term to their final
written contract. Problem 2 involves contract interpretation.4 AB and DJ
are asking the court to give meaning to the term “daily” in their written
contract.
A third problem could arise in practice. While we are mindful of the
popularity, power, and simplicity of the “rule of three” in rhetoric,5 storytelling,6 and speaking,7 we resisted the temptation to include a third problem involving contract contradiction. Consider for example, a problem in
which the written contract provides for a monthly payment of US$800.

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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3. See generally STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
70–93 (2009) (illustrating the numerous difficulties that arise in establishing existence
of a written contract).
4. “Interpretation” was distinguished from “construction” by F. Lieber, the 19th
century hermeneutics scholar (who should be distinguished from F. Leiber, the 20th
century science fiction writer). According to Lieber, “[i]nterpretation is the art of
finding out [with respect to words] . . . the sense which their author intended to convey.” FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 23, 55 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., WM S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1970) (1889). In contrast,
“[c]onstruction is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects, that lie beyond the
direct expression of the text.” Id. at 56.
5. See WHAT IS A TRICOLON, http://www.speaklikeapro.co.uk/What_is_tricolon.
htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (emphasis removed) (“A Tricolon (sometimes called
the ‘Rule of Threes’) is really more of a general principle than a rhetorical technique,
but it is very effective. For some reason, the human brain seems to absorb and remember information more effectively when it is presented in threes . . . [for example,]
‘[v]eni, vidi, vici’ . . . Julius Ceasar [or] . . . ‘The few, the proud, the Marines’—advertising slogan, United States Marine Corps”).
6. E.g., Silly Symphony: The Three Little Pigs, YOUTUBE (Jan. 20. 2013), http://
www.youtube. com/watch?v=Olo923T2HQ4; Goldilocks and the Three Bears, YOUTUBE (Jan. 20. 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63w9aPO-W_E; Rachel
Kramer Bussel, ‘50 Shades of Grey’ Is the Subject of a Course at American University,
THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/28/
50-shades-of-grey-is-the-subject-of-a-course-at-american-university.html.
7. See Richard Nordquist, What Is Barack Obama’s Secret for Giving a Great
Speech? How to Inspire an Audience With the Magic Number Three, ABOUT.COM,
http://grammar.about.com/od/essaysonstyle/a/Barack-Obamas-Victory-Speech-AndThe-Magic-Number-Three.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
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AB argues that they had agreed earlier that the payment would be
US$5,000 a year, and DJ argues that the trade custom calls for weekly
payments.8 Unlike Problem 1 and Problem 2, there is neither precedent
nor policy to support AB and DJ in their efforts to contradict an express
term in a final written contract.9
As should be clear from our two practice context problems, this article is an example of what Professor Richard Epstein10 would call “Contracts small.” According to Professor Richard Epstein, “‘Contracts small’
relates to contract law at the doctrinal level; it focuses on the rules of
contract formation and performance; the everyday ‘stuff of lawyer’s
law.’”11
This article looks to the Restatement of Contracts (hereafter “Restatement”) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (hereafter “Restatement Second”) for answers to the questions raised by the two
problems. The Restatements generally have both been praised and condemned for their focus on doctrinal issues—on what Richard Epstein

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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8. There are of course situations where it is less clear whether trade custom is
being argued to contradict an express term in a final, written contract (like our Problem 3) or to interpret an express term in a final written contract (like our Problem 2).
For example, in Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., Inc., 16 P.2d 627, 628–31 (Or. 1932), the
contract for a sale of horsemeat scraps expressly required that the scraps be greater
than 50% protein. The scraps delivered were more than 49.5% protein but less than
50%. The court held that greater than 50% protein could be interpreted as greater
than 49.5% because of trade usage. Interpretation or contradiction?
9. But cf. David W. McLauchlan, The Inconsistent Collateral Contract, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 136, 162 (1976–77) (“The object of this article has been to suggest that
inconsistency ought not to operate as a bar to the enforcement of an oral agreement
as a collateral contract where the making of the oral agreement has been proved to
the court’s satisfaction. However, it must be conceded that the long line of authorities
to the contrary means that the courts will probably not feel free to accept this
suggestion.”).
10. Professor Richard Epstein is not related biologically or intellectually to the
senior author of this article.
11. Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law
Through the Law of Laissez-Faire, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS 25, 26 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). Others have already written the “Contracts
large” articles on the parol evidence rule—articles that explore the broader questions
of political theory, such as the proper role of the state in regulating private agreements. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1743, 1756 et seq. (2000); Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott,
Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 958 et seq. (2010). Additionally,
others have written on interdisciplinary questions such as the gender bias history of
the parol evidence rule. See Hila Keren, Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of the Parol Evidence Rule With Gender in Mind, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 251 (2005).
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calls the “everyday stuff of lawyer’s law.”12 As indicated earlier, the “everyday stuff of lawyer’s law” includes the terms “extrinsic evidence,” “parol evidence,” and “parol evidence rule.”13 Let’s start by choosing some
working definitions.
II. DEFINITIONS OF “EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE,” “PAROL
EVIDENCE,” AND THE “PAROL EVIDENCE RULE”
A. Oxford English Dictionary
The United States Supreme Court regularly looks to the Oxford English Dictionary.14 The Oxford English Dictionary provides the following
definition for “parol” as an adjective: “Expressed or given orally; verbal,
oral. Now only in Law; in such phrases as parol evidence as distinguished
from documentary evidence.”15
B. French Dictionary
The words “parol” and “parole” have a common origin in the old
French and “Law-French”16 word “parol.”17 Prisoners on parole have
given their word that they will not again commit crimes.18 In French, the
word “parol” has become “parole.” An online French-to-English diction-

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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12. See generally Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements
and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205 (2007) (discussing common criticisms of
the American Law Institute and the Restatement movement).
13. But cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Toward a Prudential and Credibility-Centered Parol Evidence Rule, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 271 n.5 (2000) (“Based on the
author’s experience as editor of CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, moreover, approximately
30% of the reported contracts opinions in the past several years have involved issues
arising under the parol evidence rule.”).
14. E.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.Ct. 2156, 2170 (2012);
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2034, 2042 n.6 (2012).
15. XI THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 248 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis
omitted).
16. For a discussion of the role of Law-French in the development of law, see
PETER TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 28–36 (1999).
17. Crooks v. Sanders, 115 S.E. 760, 762 (S.C. 1922) (“The English word ‘parole’
is a shortened form of the French parole d’honneur (word of honor), the derivation of
which the lexicographers trace to the late Latin parabola and the Greek pgrgbwlh
story, parable, adopted into English as ‘parol,’ i.e., verbal, oral, word of mouth, as
now used in the legal term ‘parol evidence.’ ”).
18. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 497–98 (2008).
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ary uses the terms “word” and “speech” in its various English definitions
of the French word “parole.”19
C. Law Dictionaries
According to a 19th century law dictionary: “Parol, or more properly parole, (says Bouvier) is a French word, which means literally word
or speech.”20 The leading 21st century law dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary,21 defines “parol evidence” as “[e]vidence of oral statements”22
and defines “extrinsic evidence” as “[e]vidence relating to a contract but
not appearing on the face of the contract because it comes from other
sources, such as statements between the parties or the circumstances surrounding the agreement.”23 This language supports the conclusions that
(1) parol evidence is a form of extrinsic evidence, and (2) parol evidence
is not the only form of extrinsic evidence, since extrinsic evidence includes the circumstances surrounding the agreement.24
There is, however, additional, relevant language in Black’s definition of extrinsic evidence and parol evidence. The definition of extrinsic
evidence continues to say “[a]lso termed extraneous evidence, parol evidence, evidence aliunde,” and the definition of parol evidence goes on to
say “[s]ee extrinsic evidence.”25

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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19. Parol translation English: French Dictionary, REVERSO.NET, http://dictionary.
reverso.net/french-english/parol (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
20. Yarborough v. West, 10 Ga. 471, 473 (1851) (quoting 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 262 (3d ed. 1851)).
21. Sarah Yates, Black’s Law Dictionary: The Making of an American Standard,
103 LAW LIBR. J. 175, 181 (2011) (“Black further described the intended scope of the
dictionary in his preface: ‘The dictionary now offered to the profession is the result of
the author’s endeavor to prepare a concise and yet comprehensive book of definitions
of the terms, phrases, and maxims used in American and English law and necessary to
be understood by the working lawyer and judge. . . .’ ”).
22. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (9th ed. 2009).
23. Id. at 637.
24. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (3d ed. 1933) (Providing similar
support for this conclusion can be found in the third edition that was published
roughly contemporaneously with the Restatement. The third edition does not use the
term “extrinsic evidence” but defines “evidence aliunde” as “[e]vidence from outside,
from another source. In certain cases a written instrument can be explained by evidence aliunde, that is, by evidence drawn from sources exterior to the instrument
itself. e.g., the testimony of a witness to conversations, admissions, or preliminary
negotiations.”).
25. See generally id. (showing, again, that there is similar language in the earlier
3d edition of Black’s which concludes its definition of “parol evidence” with the statement “[i]n a particular sense, and with reference to contracts . . . parol evidence is the
same as extraneous evidence or evidence aliunde.”).
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D. This Article’s Definitions
1. “Parol evidence” and “extrinsic evidence”
In this article, we will use the term “parol evidence” to refer to precontract words of one or both of the parties. These words could be spoken or written. Even though the dictionaries’ definitions limit “parol” to
oral statements, courts and commentators consistently apply the term
“parol evidence” to both written and oral statements.26 So will we in this
article. We will use the term “extrinsic evidence,” and not the term “parol
evidence” to refer to usage, to any other evidence outside the writing,
and to evidence other than the words of the parties. There is a bit of
Lewis Carroll in this approach.27 We understand that words of the parties
spoken or written before they enter into a written agreement are actually
extrinsic to that written agreement, i.e., they could be viewed as extrinsic
evidence.
In applying the parol evidence rule, there is ample case support for
limiting the term “parol evidence” to words of the parties. Consider the
following statements from federal district courts: “The parol evidence
rule, however, only governs admissibility of prior agreements and negotiations, not other forms of extrinsic evidence”;28 “[t]he parol evidence rule
bars the introduction of the most questionable form of extrinsic evidence—self-serving testimony by one of the parties as to what the parties
‘really’ agreed to in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the
contract.”29

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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26. See Nat’l Blvd. Bank of Chicago v. Corydon Travel Bureau, Inc., 238 N.E. 2d
81, 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“[O]ral and written evidence which limited his guaranty
. . . . Such parol evidence. . . .”); Quicksilver Res., Inc. v. CMS Mktg. Servs. & Trading
Co., No. 2-03-251-CV, 2005 WL 182951, at *5 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 2005) (“oral or
written parol evidence”). See also Juanda Lowder Daniel, K.I.S.S. The Parol Evidence
Rule Goodbye: Simplifying the Concept of Protecting the Parties’ Written Agreement,
57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227, 235 (2007) (“[T]he word ‘parol’ means by word of mouth
[citing to Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary] as opposed to in written form. However,
from early on, the parol evidence rule has been applied to exclude both oral and
written matters occurring prior to creation of the written agreement.”).
27. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS 254 (Alfred A. Knoph) (1872) (“When I use a word, it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”); Parker B. Potter, Jr., Wondering About
Alice: Judicial References to Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, 28
WHITTIER L. REV. 175, 176 n.6 (2006).
28. Klosek v. Am. Express Co., No. 08-426, 2008 WL 4057534, at *13 n.9 (D.
Minn., Aug. 26, 2008).
29. Hoover v. ABF Freight System, Inc., No. 06–1301, 2008 WL 1805392, at *8
(C.D. Ill., Apr. 18, 2008) (quoting Regency Commercial Associates, LLC v. Lopax,
Inc., 869 N.E.2d 310, 327 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), quoting Judge Richard Posner, The Law
and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2005)).
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2. Conflation
Courts sometimes “conflate”30 the terms parol evidence and extrinsic evidence.31 Consider this statement from one opinion: “The parol evidence rule bars extrinsic evidence of prior negotiations offered to
contradict or supplement a written contract.”32 In another opinion, the
court said, “since the liberalization of California’s parol evidence rule,
parol evidence of custom and usage is admissible to interpret the meaning
of written words.”33 For the purposes of this article, we define “evidence
of prior negotiations” as parol evidence, and “evidence of custom” as extrinsic evidence, and not parol evidence.
3. Parol evidence rule and parol agreements
Let’s now establish a working definition of the phrase “parol evidence rule.” Law review discussions of the parol evidence rule often34
begin with the following quotation from a nineteenth century evidence
treatise: “Few things are darker than this [the parol evidence rule], or
fuller of subtle difficulties.”35
“In part, the parol evidence rule is so ‘dark and difficult’ . . . because
. . . there exists even today no definitive statement of the [parol evidence]

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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30. See generally Margaret Kniffin, Conflating and Confusing Contract Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor Wearing Someone Else’s Clothes?,
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 75 (2009) (providing background and meaning for the word
“conflate” which we decided to use after a December 12, 2012 Westlaw search of the
JLR data produced 7,189 hits for the word “conflate” and a Westlaw search of the
Yale Law Journal database produced 113 hits).
31. Compare Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vigo Coal Co., 393 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir.
2004) (using the phrase “parol (i.e. extrinsic evidence)”), with Bohler-Udderholm
Am., Inc. v. Elwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 93 (3d Cir. 2001) (using the phrase
“extrinsic evidence, i.e., parol evidence”). See also Addicks Servs. Inc. v. GGPBridgeland Lp., 596 F.3d 286, 294 (5th Cir. 2010) (using the phrase, “course of performance”—i.e., what the contracting parties have done post-contract—as a form of
“parol evidence”).
32. Hofeldt v. Mehling, 658 N.W.2d 783, 787 (S.D. 2003). See C.R. Anthony Co. v.
Loretto Mall Partners, 1991-NMSC-070, ¶ 16, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (“parol
evidence rule . . . bars admission of extrinsic evidence”).
33. Buchanan v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 177 F.Supp.2d 1005,
1008–1009 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
34. Charles, L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1310 n.457 (1998) (“obligatory”).
35. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390 (1898). See Clark v. Sideris, 1982-NMSC-151, ¶ 11, 99 N.M. 209, 656
P.2d 872 (“The parol evidence rule is a source of considerable confusion.”).
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rule.”36 The differences among the statements of the parol evidence are
often substantive. Carefully reread the two quoted excerpts from court
opinions that were reproduced in the last paragraph of Part II.D.1 in this
article. Notice that the two statements differ not only as to what evidence
is affected by the parol evidence rule, but also as to what questions are
governed by the parol evidence rule.
The first quoted excerpt uses the term “parol evidence rule” to examine whether terms can be added to an agreement that has been reduced to writing—like our Problem 1 in which adding a time of
performance term to the written janitorial services contract is to be examined. The second quoted excerpt applies the parol evidence rule to a
question of interpreting a term in a written contract—as in our Problem
2, in which interpreting the term “daily” in the written janitorial services
contract is to be examined.
Courts and commentators agree that the parol evidence rule applies
to questions of whether terms can be added to an agreement that has
been reduced to writing. As Professor Steven Burton writes:

For purposes of this article, we will use Professor Burton’s doctrinal statement as the parol evidence rule. Note in particular, Professor Burton’s
use of the phrase “oral and written.”
The first case that applied the parol evidence rule involved oral testimony. Scholars38 trace the parol evidence rule’s origins back to The
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36. Ralph James Mooney, A Friendly Letter to the Oregon Supreme Court: Let’s
Try Again on the Parol Evidence Rule, 84 OR. L. REV. 369, 372 (2005). See also
Linzer, supra note 2, at 807 (“So, instead of a parol evidence ‘rule,’ there is a continuum of many different approaches, all using the same name and often the same
words.”).
37. BURTON, supra note 3, at 64 (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Keren, supra note 11, at 259; Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Contract as a Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 91 n.7 (2001).
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The most widely endorsed version of the common law parol evidence rule may be stated in two parts as follows, synthesizing the
authorities read for this study: (1) Where an enforceable, written
agreement is the final and complete expression of the parties’
agreement, prior oral and written agreements and contemporaneous oral agreements (together ‘parol agreements’) . . . do not establish contract terms when the parol agreement contradicts or
adds to the terms of the writing; (2) in addition, when an enforceable, written agreement is the final, but not the complete, expression of the parties’ agreement, a parol agreement may add to, but
may not contradict, the written terms. This doctrinal statement, as
far as it goes, is a matter of wide consensus.37
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Countess of Rutland’s Case.39 The case concerned a transfer of land.40 Edward Earl of Rutland, willed his property, Eykering, to his wife, the
Countess, and by a later, second document to “heirs males of the body of
the said Thomas Earl of Rutland,” his father.41 By these contradictory
documents, Edward’s nephew, Roger, stood to take Eykering, because he
had been granted the property the day after the will was executed. The
Countess wanted to use the oral testimony of trustees to prove that Edward really meant to give the property to her at his death. In ruling for
Roger, the court relied in part on a rationale that can be read as limiting
the parol evidence rule to alleged oral agreements: “[I]t would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration, and
which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties
should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory.”42
According to Professor Farnsworth, this language is no longer the
important language from the case: “Now the conceit that the parol evidence rule is rooted in the relative unreliability of testimony based on
‘slippery memory’ in contrast with the ‘certain truth’ afforded by a writing has fallen from favor.”43 And, there is other language in Countess of
Rutland that supports Professor Farnsworth’s “conceit”: “If other agreements or limitation of uses be made by writing or by other matter as high
or higher, then the last agreement shall stand; for every contract or agreement ought to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as the first
deed.”44 Since this Countess of Rutland language extends the parol evidence rule to prior written agreements, it must have a policy base other
than concern about the “uncertain testimony of slippery memory.”
Professor Marvin Chirelstein agrees with Farnsworth’s conceit:
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39. The Countess of Rutland’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B.).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
43. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.2, at 213 (2d ed
1998). But cf. Mark O. Morris & Elizabeth Evensen, What’s Happening to the Parol
Evidence Rule? More Holes in the Dike, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 209, 219 (2000) (“The
policy behind the parol evidence rule is ‘to give the writing a preferred status so as to
render it immune to perjured testimony and the risk of uncertain testimony of slippery memory.’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
44. Countess of Rutland, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90.
45. But cf. Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 745 (“Why this
[the parol evidence rule] should be so is one of the common law’s enduring puzzles.”).
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The purpose of the rule is apparent.45 Since the completion and
execution of a written contract is typically the concluding point in
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the bargaining process, one’s ordinary expectation is that the document itself will contain all the conscious and important elements
of the deal. . . . The parol evidence rule assumes that the formal
writing reflects the parties’ minds at a point of maximum resolution and, hence, that duties and restrictions that do not appear in
the written document, even though apparently accepted an earlier
stage, were not intended by the parties to survive.46
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46. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 98 (5th ed. 2006) (emphasis added).
47. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 67.
48. Compare Kniffin, supra note 30, at 81–90 section B entitled “The Scholars
Who Have Discerned the Difference,” with Eric Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the
Plain Meaning Rule and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 533, 534 (1998) (“Most courts would subscribe to something close to the following statement of the parol evidence rule: A court will refuse to use evidence of the
parties’ prior negotiations in order to interpret a written contract unless the writing is
(1) incomplete, (2) ambiguous or (3) the product of fraud, mistake, or a similar bargaining defect.”).
49. Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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Notice also that Professor Burton uses the phrase “parol agreements” instead of Professor Chirelstein’s phrase “duties and restrictions,” or the
more widely used term “parol evidence.” Professor Burton explains: “Parol agreements should be distinguished from parol evidence; the latter
may not amount to an agreement and therefore would not bind either
party. The parol evidence rule applies to render parol agreements inoperative when they are offered to establish contract terms.”47
Thus, we have a “parol evidence” rule that is (1) not limited to “parol” insofar as that originally meant “oral,” but (2) is limited to “parol
agreements” and not to other words of one or both of the parties, and (3)
is further limited to questions of whether parol agreements can add terms
to a written contract. In sum, questions on whether parol evidence can be
used to interpret terms in a written contract are outside the purview of
the parol evidence rule.
Courts do not necessarily embrace Professor Burton’s parol evidence rule. As noted earlier, some courts go further than Professor Burton, and invoke the term “parol evidence rule” when deciding whether to
consider parol evidence and extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning
of a term in a written contract. The use of the parol evidence rule has
been widely (but not uniformly) criticized by law professors48 and by the
courts. According to Lee v. Flintkote Co.,49 “[s]trictly speaking, the parol
evidence rule does not bar extra-contractual evidence of meanings assigned to the terms of an agreement; that is the function of the plain
meaning rule which prohibits consideration of extrinsic evidence of intent
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when the contract is unequivocal.”50 Similarly, Burlison v. United States51
tells us:
More recently, academic authority has recognized that although
courts often conflate the parol-evidence rule with the plain-meaning rule, ‘[a] clear conceptual division would treat the plain meaning rule as about interpreting the provisions of contracts, and the
parol evidence rule as about establishing what count[s] as the controlling terms of integrated contracts.’52

In this article, we will use the term “plain meaning rule” and not the term
“parol evidence rule” in addressing questions on the meaning of a word
in a written contract.53 We will address questions about whether courts
should look to parol evidence in determining whether the meaning of a
written term is “plain” and suggest that courts look to policy rather than
the parol evidence rule to resolve these questions. Further, we will address the uncertainty in the law caused in part by the courts’ differing
uses of terminology.54 With this background, we will now apply the Re-
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50. Id. at 1281.
51. Burlison v. United States, 533 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2009).
52. Id. at 430 (quoting Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation:
Wills and Contracts, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533, 587 (2005)). See also Arthur L.
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L. Q.
161 (1965); Kniffin, supra note 30, at 75. But see BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW:
RULES, THEORY AND CONTEXT 59 (2012) (“The parol evidence rule deals with the
admission of other (‘extrinsic’) evidence to help in the interpretation of a written
document.”); Linzer, supra note 2, at 801 (“the parol evidence rule and the plain
meaning rule are conjoined like Siamese twins”); Posner, supra note 48, at 534 n.1
(“Because both the parol evidence rule and the plain meaning rule concern the same
issue—under what circumstances extrinsic evidence can be used to supplement a writing—they are best analyzed together.”).
53. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 109 (“The most widely adopted statements of
the plain meaning rule say that ‘[a]n unambiguous contract will be given its plain
meaning.’ ”); see also Linzer, supra note 2, at 803 (“In its most rigid form, the plain
meaning rule bars extrinsic evidence unless the word is ambiguous on its face. The
flaw in plain meaning is, of course, the notion of a latent ambiguity.”).
54. We will address the question of whether courts should use either the “parol
evidence rule” or the “plain meaning rule” or neither the “parol evidence rule” nor
the “plain meaning rule” in resolving questions as to what a term in a written agreements means. But cf. Linzer, supra note 2, at 838–39 (“Formalism of the kind found in
plain meaning and an ‘objectivist’ parol evidence rule is much easier to carry out than
weighing context, credibility, linguistic sensibility, and the many other factors that can
go into an interpretation of words that may or may not mean what we think they
mean. It is comforting to live in a world of plain meaning. But that world just isn’t
real.”).
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statement and the Restatement Second to the questions raised by our two
problems.
III. RESTATEMENT55
Uncertainty as to the governing law, generally caused by different
outcomes in cases, drove the Restatement movement.56 The Restatement
was the first work product of the American Law Institute (ALI). The
ALI was incorporated in 1923. According to the statement of purpose in
the ALI’s certificate of incorporation: “The particular business and objects of the society are educational, and are to promote the clarification
and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to
secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on
scholarly and scientific legal work.”57 People who attended the first meeting of the ALI were told that achieving the purposes described in the
ALI’s certificate of incorporation would be impossible unless the existing
law could be first established with some degree of certainty, and that the
two causes of uncertainty were (1) “lack of agreement among lawyers
concerning the fundamental principles of the common law” and (2) “the
lack of precision in the use of legal terms.”58 They were also told that the
ALI should create a “Restatement of the Law” to cure (1) and (2).59
The first such Restatement, the Restatement of Contracts, was completed nine years later. Each Restatement was the result of the work of a
Reporter, an exceptional scholar in the field; a committee of Advisors;
and a Council to supervise and provide recommendations on the work of
the Reporter and his Advisors. Tentative drafts were prepared and submitted to all ALI members well in advance of the ALI annual meetings.
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55. Some reported decisions still make use of the Restatement First provisions
relating to parol evidence and extrinsic evidence. E.g., In re E. Airport Dev., LLC,
443 B.R. 823, 829 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal “Z” ENA, Inc., 598 A.2d
1234, 1236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
56. Proceedings of 1923 Annual Meeting, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 14 (1923). E.g., Edward
White, The American Law Institute and The Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15
LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (“[T]he starting point of the ALI project, [began with]
its founders’ conclusions that the American legal system was suffering from its increased ‘uncertainty.’ ” (alteration added)); see also Robert W. Stayton & Marian O.
Boner, The Plastic Code in Operation: II, 36 TEX. L. REV. 733, 734–35 (1958). See
generally John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV.
615 (1998).
57. See Bennett Boskey, The American Law Institute: A Glimpse at its Future, 12
GREEN BAG 2D 255, 256 (2009).
58. Frank, supra note 56, at 615–17.
59. Id.
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“The goal was to have each Restatement represent the considered legal
judgment, not merely of the Reporter, nor even of his Advisers, but of
the profession throughout the country.”60
Whether the Restatement of Contracts represents the “considered
legal judgment . . . of the profession throughout the country” has been
questioned. Professor Samuel Williston,61 author of the leading Contracts
treatise, was the Reporter for the Restatement of Contracts. According
to Professor Arthur Corbin,62
[Williston] was older than the advisers (13 [years] older than I)
and he had published much more. Also, he had had large contacts
with bench and bar, and ‘he had a way with him.’ He asked his
advisers (if they would) to go through his treatise and point out
spots needing correction or amendment. Nobody did this but me
. . . . Williston was hard to move from a position (justly so) . . . .63

Professor Alan Milner, a Fellow at Trinity College, Oxford, made the
same point more bluntly “Williston’s Restatement of Contracts is only Williston on Contracts under a new name and reduced in size. . . .”64 The
“reduced size” product consisted of two volumes. It was more than 1,200
pages long, and included 609 sections of black letter law, with comments
and illustrations that accompanied most sections, but contained no citations.65 The 609 sections were divided into chapters which were further
subdivided into topics. Chapter 9 was entitled “The Scope and Meaning
of Contracts,” and that chapter was subdivided into three topics: “Topic
1. Interpretation,” “Topic 2. Parol Evidence Rule,” and “Topic 3. Usage.”
Note that the Restatement treated “Contract Interpretation” and “The
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60. Id. at 620.
61. See Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207
(2005) (an intellectual history); SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1940) (personal history).
62. Professor Corbin was one of the eight selected advisers to Samuel Williston.
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, at ix, x (1932). Corbin later stated that
Williston “chose me as his chief critic and adviser.” Arthur L. Corbin, Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1963).
63. Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 755, 768–69 (1993).
64. Alan Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal Experiment, 20 U. PITT. L.
REV. 795, 798 (1959). See also Frank, supra note 56, at 621 (“[R]eporters like Williston . . . were essentially codifying the treatises with the Restatements . . . .”).
65. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM.
L. REV. 397, 402–403 (1933) (“The text is most abstract in character; the comment
explains, qualifies, and justifies in general terms; the illustrations have the same concreteness as law school examination questions, the latter being usually much more
complex and difficult.”).
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Parol Evidence Rule” as separate topics. So did the edition of Williston’s
Contracts treatise published shortly after the Restatement. Professor
Herbert Wechsler,66 Director of the ALI, described the relationship between the Restatement and Williston’s treatise as follows: “[V]ouching, as
it were in his famous treatise, as warranty for the positions that the Institute espoused.”67
Let’s now examine the Restatement’s (and Williston’s Contract
treatise’s) “The Parol Evidence Rule” using our two Problems.68
A. Parol Evidence and Contract Supplementation
In Problem 1, AB’s testimony that AB and DJ had agreed on a
starting time is parol evidence. No section in the Restatement topic entitled “The Parol Evidence Rule” uses the term “parol evidence rule” or
even parol evidence in the text. Section 237, the first of eight sections in
Topic 2, “Parol Evidence Rule,” is the only section with “Parol Evidence
Rule” in its title,69 and is generally referred to as the Restatement’s parol
evidence rule.70 The other sections in Topic 2 can be treated as qualifications or exceptions to the parol evidence rule. The words in Section 237
are consistent with the words of the first part of Professor Steven Burton’s “most widely endorsed version of the parol evidence rule.”71 Section
237 provides:
Except as stated in §§ 240, 241 the integration of an agreement
makes inoperative to add to or to vary the agreement all contemporaneous oral agreements relating to the same subject matter;
and also, unless the integration is void, or voidable and avoided,
all prior oral or written agreements relating thereto. If either void
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66. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1359 (2000).
67. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, at vii (Tentative Draft
Nos. 1–7, 1973).
68. See generally John H. Wigmore, A Brief History of the Parol Evidence Rule, 4
COLUM. L. REV. 338, 338–39 (1904) (explaining that the Parol Evidence Rule did not
originate in the Restatement. Its origins are generally traced to the Middle Ages and
the superior evidentiary value of sealed documents).
69. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1932) (showing the other
sections in Topic 2 can be treated as qualifications or exceptions).
70. See Rodriguez v. Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, 276 F.2d 344, 349
n.2 (1st Cir. 1960) (“1 Restatement, Contracts § 237, Com. (b) (1932), . . . where the
parol evidence rule is set forth. . . .”); Arman v. Structiform Engineering Co., Inc., 24
N.W.2d 723, 727 (1946) (“In Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 237, p. 331, the
parol evidence rule. . . .”).
71. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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or voidable and avoided, the integration leaves the operation of
prior agreements unaffected.
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72. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1932). See Proceedings of 1971
Annual Meeting, 48 A.L.I. PROC. 446 (1971) (according to Professor Braucher, “I
think there is a certain sorrow about the phrase ‘integrated agreement’ and if you had
a better word, it could well be an improvement.” Apparently, no one had a “better
word.”).
73. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1932).
74. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 1830 (rev. ed. 1936).
75. See supra text accompanying note 37.
76. Cf. Burnham, supra note 1 at 121 (“Law students always focus initially on this
question, believing that . . . the most important issue is whether the agreement was
made.”); id. (supporting that in considering AB’s evidence of e-mails, the court would
have to determine whether the e-mails establish whether an agreement was made as
to starting time).
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Section 237 contains the phrase “integration of an agreement” that requires reference back to Section 228 which defines integration.72 In a contracts context, integration means (1) in written agreement between two
people that is (2) “a final statement of their intentions as to the matters
contained therein.”73 The Restatement’s Section 237 phrase “makes inoperative to add” would seem to be a blanket prohibition on a court’s decision to look to parol evidence in contract supplementation problems like
our Problem 1. Section 237, however, should be read together with Sections 239–40.
Section 239 provides in pertinent part, “Effect of Partial Integration.
Where there is integration of part of the terms of a contract[,] prior written agreements and contemporaneous oral agreements are operative to
vary these terms only to the same extent as if the whole contract had
been integrated.” (emphasis added). Section 239, and in particular, the
words “to vary,” should be read carefully. What is important are the
words that are not in Section 239—the words “to add.” Under Section
239, a partial integration makes “inoperative” parol agreements that
“vary” it does not expressly make inoperative parol agreements that add
terms. Williston restates Restatement Section 239 as follows: “[a]n incomplete writing may be added to by parol.”74 In essence, Restatement Section 239 is the second part of Professor Burton’s parol evidence rule.75
When examining Problem 1, a court could rely on the Restatement
to support its consideration76 of AB’s e-mails that DJ would not begin
work until 10 p.m. More precisely, a court could rely on Restatement
Section 239 to support its consideration of AB’s e-mails if the written
contract was final but incomplete—i.e., a “partial integration.”
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Restatement Section 229, entitled “Partial Integration,” expressly
acknowledges the possibility that “[p]art of the terms of an agreement
may be integrated”; but it does not explain how courts are to determine
whether a writing is only a partial integration.77 Under the Restatement,
courts are to look only to the writing itself to determine whether it is a
partial integration.78 Williston’s treatise provides the following justification for this “four corners”79 approach: “[I]f the court may seek this intention from extrinsic circumstances, the very fact that the parties made a
contemporaneous oral agreement will of itself prove that they did not
intend the writing to be a complete memorial.”80
Section 240(b) provides an alternative ground for a court’s consideration of additional terms as parol evidence—if “the agreement is not inconsistent with the integrated contract, and . . . is such an agreement as
might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as
were the parties to the written contract.” A determination of “naturalness” would seem even more difficult than a determination of whether
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77. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1932).
78. See Universal Major Elec. Appliances v. Glenwood Range Co., 223 F.2d 76,
78 (4th Cir. 1955) (“[O]nly a partial integration of the contract since it . . . showed of
itself that something was needed to complete the agreement. See Restatement of Contracts, § 229.”).
79. See Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The
Sounds of Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 45 (1985) (Supporting that neither the
Restatement nor Williston used the term “four corners.” Others have so described
this approach to determining whether an agreement is a partial integration.) (“Williston’s test for determining whether an integration is total or partial is a liberalization
of the “four corners” test because, under Williston’s test, facial completeness of the
writing does not necessarily result in finding a total integration. Under Williston’s
highly influential test, adopted by the Restatement of Contracts (First Restatement)”); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using
“Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard
Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 534 (2008) (“Williston . . . took the view
that the question of integration could be resolved by looking within the ‘four corners’
of the writing.”); Daniel, supra note 25, at 243 (“ ‘four corners’ approach as adopted
by Professor Samuel Williston”). But see JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 113 (6th ed. 2009).
80. WILLISTON, supra note 74, at 1820. See also Movsesian, supra note 61, at 267,
268 (“Williston’s penchant for abbreviated policy arguments—his tendency to describe the effect of legal rules in intuitive terms—can strike a contemporary academic
reader as unsophisticated, even banal. . . . Today most legal scholars think of themselves as writing primarily for other academics. . . . Williston understands the enterprise of legal scholarship quite differently. . . . Williston believes that his most
important task as a scholar consists of creating a doctrinal system that attorneys and
business people can use on an everyday basis, one that simplifies the law and makes it
more comprehensible.”).

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 38 Side B

02/06/2014 10:11:19

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX102.txt

66

unknown

Seq: 18

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

6-FEB-14

9:59

[Vol. 44

the written contract is a “partial integration.”81 The most helpful word in
Section 240(b) is “might.” It is much easier to meet a “might be in a
separate agreement” test than to meet a “would be in a separate agreement” test. As Comment (d) to Restatement Section 240 explains, “[i]t is
not essential that the particular provision would always or even usually be
made in a separate collateral agreement. It is enough that making such a
provision in that way is not so exceptional as to be odd or unnatural.”
One of the illustrations of an agreement that might “naturally be made”
without inclusion in an integrated contract involves time of performance,82 i.e., our Problem 1.
The Restatement provides a two-part “justification” for the “Parol
Evidence Rule” in a Comment to Section 240:83 (1) most written contracts
set out everything that was included in the bargain, and (2) certainty is
attained by making a general rule that the written contract does set out
everything that was included in the bargain.84 Recall that certainty was
one of the basic goals of the American Law Institute in promulgating the
Restatements.85 Note that Williston’s work has been generally described
as a “shrine to certainty.”86
B. Extrinsic Evidence and Contract Supplementation
In Problem 1, DJ’s evidence about customary starting times is extrinsic evidence. The Restatement neither uses the term “parol evidence,”
nor the term “extrinsic evidence.” The Restatement does, however, in a
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81. See Hadjiyannakis, supra note 79 at 47–48 (“Not surprisingly, the courts have
not found the ‘naturalness’ test helpful in this context. . . . [M]ost cases that admit
proof of the oral agreement resort to the ‘incomplete on its face’ approach.”). But cf.
Phipps v. Union Stock Yards Nat. Bank, 34 P.2d 561, 563 (Kan. 1934); Markoff v.
Kreiner, 23 A.2d 19, 24 (Md. 1941).
82. See infra note 86.
83. Section 237, comment a, of the Restatement provides “this Section states what
is known as the parol evidence rule” but does not provide a justification for the parol
evidence. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. a (1932). Comment d to
§ 240 is the only place the Restatement addresses justification, and the only place the
Restatement capitalizes the Parol Evidence Rule. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 240 cmt. d (1932).
84. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 240 cmt. d (1932).
85. See 1 A.L.I. PROC. 7–8 (1923), supra note 56; Frank, supra note 56, at 617. But
cf. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the
American Law Institute–The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L.REV. 1, 13–14.
86. Anthony J. Waters, For Grant Gilmore, 36 MD. L. REV. 270, 272 (1976–1977)
(reviewing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) describing Williston’s work as a “shrine to certainty”). See also Allen D. Boyer, Samuel Williston’s
Struggle With Depression, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 23 (1994) (“Williston held up simplicity
and certainty as intrinsic values toward which the law should aspire.”).

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A

02/06/2014 10:11:19

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX102.txt

Spring 2014]

unknown

Seq: 19

6-FEB-14

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

9:59

67

topic separate from the Parol Evidence Rule, utilize the term “usage,”
which as that term is defined in Restatement Section 24587 includes DJ’s
evidence about usual starting times. The general rule under Restatement
Section 246(b) is that courts can look to usage to add terms to a written
contract.88 This general rule is limited by the somewhat cryptic phrase
“not inconsistent with the agreement or manifestations of intention.”89
Since there was nothing in the written agreement in Problem 1 as to time
of performance, DJ’s extrinsic evidence of when janitorial work customarily begins is not “inconsistent with the agreement.” What about Restatement Section 246(b)’s other limiting phrase “manifestations of
intention”? The Comment to Restatement Section 246(b) explains “[t]he
test . . . is the practical one, whether a reasonable contracting party might
enter into the written contract in question and have intended to be bound
by both its express terms, and also by the terms of the usage or collateral
parol agreement in question.”90
Restatement Section 246 then sets forth four Illustrations of Clause
(b). In each instance, usage became a part of the contract. Similarly, in
the four reported cases that expressly considered Section 246’s “not inconsistent with the . . . manifestations of intention” limitation, the courts
included usage as a term of the contract, relying primarily on one or more
of the illustrations.91 Section 246’s Illustration 10 which deals with a trade
usage as to time performance when the contract is silent as to time of
performance, seems indistinguishable from Problem 1:

C M
Y K
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87. “Usage is habitual or customary practice.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CON§ 245 (1932).
88. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 246(b) (1932) (“Operative usages
have the effect of . . . adding to the agreement . . . not inconsistent with the agreement
or manifestations of intention.”).
89. Id.
90. Id. at cmt. b.
91. Certain cases invoke Section 246 to exclude evidence of custom that was contrary to the agreement. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Good Hope Refineries, Inc., 604 F.2d
865, 875 (5th Cir. 1979); Distillers Distrib Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 180 F.2d
800, 804 (4th Cir. 1950); State ex rel Porter Co. v. Nangle, 405 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1966); Hopper v. Lennen & Mitchell, 52 F.Supp. 319, 324 (S.D. Cal. 1943);
Heiden v. General Motors Corp., 567 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
TRACTS
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A contracts to sell and B to buy a hundred barrels of flour at $8 a
barrel. By an operative usage in contracts for the sale of flour
where the contract fixes no time for the payment of the price, payment is regarded as due ten days after delivery. The meaning of
B’s promise is a promise to pay the price ten days after delivery of
the flour.
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Therefore, when applying Restatement Section 246 to Problem 1, a court
could consider DJ’s extrinsic evidence of when janitorial work customarily begins to determine DJ’s starting time.
C. Resolving Inconsistent Parol Evidence and Extrinsic Evidence
During Contract Supplementation
Problem 1, unlike Section 246’s Illustration 10 above, involves both
parol evidence (AB and DJ’s agreement) and extrinsic evidence (trade
custom) that are in conflict with each other. This then raises the question
of how to resolve this conflict. Comment (b) of Section 246 suggests that
greater weight be given to extrinsic evidence: “Concrete cases seem to
indicate that reasonable persons are much more likely to rely on a recognized usage to affect the otherwise natural implications of their written
contracts than on collateral parol agreements.”92 However, this language
in Comment (b) to Restatement Section 246 is inconsistent with Illustration 4 of Section 240:
A and B in an integrated contract respectively promise to sell and
to buy specified goods. No time or place for delivery is specified.
If no agreement is made as to these matters the rule of law is that
the goods are deliverable in a reasonable time at the seller’s place
of business. A contemporaneous oral agreement that the goods
shall be delivered within thirty days, at the buyer’s place of business, is operative.
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92. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 246 cmt. b (1932).
93. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 640, at 1840
(3d ed. Jaeger rev. 1963). Professor Hadjiyannakis explains that the Restatement and
Williston regard custom and usage as implied in law and the terms of a written contract as implied in fact and “[a]ccording to Williston and the First Restatement, parol
evidence is admissible to contradict implications of law but it may not be used to
contradict the implied in fact terms of the writing.” Hadjiyannakis, supra note 79, at
55–56.
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Williston’s treatise, published only a few years after the Restatement,
supports the result in Illustration 4. According to Williston, where no
time for performance is fixed in a written contract, the law fixes the time
in accordance with certain rules irrespective of what the parties actually
intended. Williston writes “‘[W]hen an ordinary contract does not state
the time for performance, and the parties orally agree on a particular
time,’ the legal implication that they intended a reasonable time is an
implication ‘fictitiously invented by the law.’”93 Williston’s use of the
phrase “and the parties orally agree” assumes away too many litigable
issues. Often, as in Problem 1, one party will contend either that there
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was never an oral agreement as to time of performance, or that if there
was such an agreement by later entering into a written contract that was
silent as to time of performance, the parties intended to discharge the
earlier oral agreement as to time of performance.94
When there is a conflict between parol evidence and extrinsic evidence, a court would be required to answer two different questions: (1) is
the parol evidence admissible and if so, (2) which should control: parol
evidence or extrinsic evidence. Under the Restatement, parol evidence is
admissible under Section 239 if the writing is a partial integration, or
under Section 240 if the oral agreement meets the “naturalness” test. The
Restatement’s standards for answering the second question are less clear.
At best, language found in a comment and in an illustration support conflicting arguments.
D. Parol Evidence and Contract Interpretation
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94. Cf. Hadjiyannakis, supra note 79, at 46 (“An alleged agreement fixing the
time for performance is such an integral part of the transaction that if the agreement
were intended to be a part of the contract, one might ordinarily have expected the
parties to have included it in the writing.”).
95. WILLISTON, supra note 74, at 1813.
96. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. a (1932) (“Nor is it [the
parol evidence rule] a rule of interpretation.”).
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Problem 2 involves contract interpretation—the meaning of the
term “daily” in the written agreement is an issue that should be resolved.
As noted earlier, the Restatement chapter entitled “The Scope and
Meaning of Contracts” is divided into three separate topics: “Topic 1. Interpretation,” Topic 2. Parol Evidence Rule,” and “Topic 3. Usage.” The
Restatement’s separation of the parol evidence rule from contract interpretation was based on Williston’s belief that the parol evidence rule “is
not a rule of interpretation or construction. It is a rule of substantive law
which, when applicable, defines the limit of a contract. It fixes the subject
matter for interpretation though not itself a rule of interpretation.”95 In
contrast, under the Restatement, the parol evidence rule will not preclude a court’s consideration of parol evidence when the question is one
of contract interpretation. Under the Restatement, the parol evidence
rule precludes consideration of parol evidence in the form of agreements
between the parties only when the question is one of adding new terms to
a written contract, and not one of interpreting terms already in the
writing.96

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B

02/06/2014 10:11:19

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX102.txt

70

unknown

Seq: 22

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

6-FEB-14

9:59

[Vol. 44

When does interpretation end and supplementation begin?97 Interpretation is limited to giving meaning to actual words in a contract whose
meaning is unclear or ambiguous.98 Obviously there will be some99 situations in which it is not obvious whether evidence is being offered to add a
term to a written contract, or to give meaning to a term that is already in
the writing.
Consider, for example, the “Chicken Case,”100 Frigaliment,101 which
is a classic case in a typical first year Contracts law course. There, the
buyer sued for breach of a “sale of goods” contract that described the
goods to be sold as “U.S. Fresh Frozen Chicken.”102 The seller delivered
boiling hens. The buyer contended that the contract required the delivery
of young chickens suitable for broiling and frying. Judge Friendly103 concluded that the issue was one of contract interpretation—“what is
chicken?”104 Alternatively, Judge Friendly could have concluded that the
issue in Frigaliment was one of contract addition—can parol evidence105
or extrinsic evidence106 add the term “young” or the term “suitable for

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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97. C.R. Anthony Company v. Loretto Mall Partners, 1991–NMSC–070, ¶16, 112
N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (“The operative question then becomes whether the evidence
is offered to contradict the writing or aid in its interpretation. We leave these distinctions to case-by-case development by our lower courts.”).
98. E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939,
962–63 (1967). See also STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 120–22 (2009).
99. And “some” law professors would substitute the word “most” or the word
“all” for “some.” See CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, supra note 79, at 129
(“The very same words that are offered as an additional term that are rejected because the court deems the writing to be a complete integration can be offered as an
aid to interpretation of a written term.”).
100. See (yes, actually see) R.B. Craswell, Chicken in a Contract (Frigaliment Importing Co. v BNS International Sales), YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELwt-KXz8GA.
101. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F.Supp. 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
102. Id. at 117.
103. The Frigaliment case was heard by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York shortly after Judge Friendly’s appointment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to his appointment,
Judge Friendly had been a founding partner of Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Cox.
While he had participated in numerous appeals, his trial court experience was very
limited. And so, he volunteered to sit as a district court judge in the Frigaliment case.
See DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 60, 81, 315
(2012).
104. Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F.Supp. at 117.
105. Id. at 118.
106. Id. at 119.
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broiling for frying” to the written contract?107 Problem 2 is unlike Frigaliment. In Problem 2, it is clear that parol evidence and extrinsic evidence
is not being offered to add a term to the written contract which contains
the term “daily.” The argument is whether the word “daily” is or is not
“ambiguous.”
The word “ambiguous” is a critical part of Restatement Section 230
which is entitled “Standard of Interpretation Where There is Integration.” Section 230 provides:
The standard of interpretation of an integration, except where it
produces an ambiguous result, . . . is the meaning that would be
attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the
integration, other than oral statements by the parties of what they
intended it to mean.108

Subject to its “ambiguous” exception,109 the standard for interpretation in
Restatement Section 230 is an objective one—“the meaning that would
be attached . . . by a reasonably intelligent person.” Therefore, Section
230’s test for determining whether a term is ambiguous is an objective
one.110 As Professor Perillo explains:
For Williston the contract acquires a life and meaning of its own,
separate and apart from the meaning the parties attach to their
agreement. It is not primarily the intention of the parties which
the court is seeking, but the meaning of the words at the time and
place when they were used. He is explicit in stating why this
should be so. A facility and certainty of interpretation is obtained,

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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107. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for
Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1857 n.61 (2004) (explaining an alternate legal principle under which to settle Frigaliment) (“Indeed, a year after issuing
the Frigaliment Importing decision, Judge Henry Friendly admitted that the case
might better have been decided on substantive assent grounds.” (citing Dadourain
Exp. Corp. v. United States, 291 F.2d 178, 187 n.4 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting))).
108. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932) (emphasis added).
109. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 cmt. a (1932) (explaining that both the first sentence of
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 and the first sentence of RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 cmt. a thereto use the article “the” before the word
“standard” indicating the authors contemplated a single, fixed approach to contract
interpretation).
110. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 cmt. a (1932) (“The objective
viewpoint of a third person is taken.”).
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which, though not ideal, is so much greater than is obtainable by
use of a less rigid standard. The certainty so obtained is more than
adequate compensation for the slight restriction put upon the
power to grant and contract.111

Whether the court can consider what the parties said about the meaning
of the word “daily” in the written contract in Problem 2 would turn on
whether the word “daily” is unclear or ambiguous to a reasonable person.112 Section 230 expressly provides that “oral statements of the parties”
cannot be considered when determining whether the words in a contact
are ambiguous.
In Problem 2, AB’s parol evidence is something other than an oral
statement. E-mails are not “oral statements by the parties” but are still
parol evidence as that term is used in this article, and in general, by
courts.113 Neither the language of Restatement Section 230 nor the comments thereto expressly preclude a court from considering earlier writings
of the parties in interpreting words found in their final writing. Section
230 bars only “oral statements by the parties as to what they intended it
to mean.” Nonetheless, the underlying objective policy as explained by
Williston would seem equally applicable to exclude parol evidence in the
form of e-mails when determining whether the word “daily” in Problem 2
was ambiguous.

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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111. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 132 (6th ed.
2009) (internal footnotes and quotation marks omitted). See also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 cmt. b (1932) (“They have assented to the writing as the
expression of the things to which they agree, therefore the terms of the writing are
conclusive, and a contract may have a meaning different from that which either party
supposed it to have.”).
112. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 238 cmt. a (1932) (“Such statements
are also admissible . . . if there is an ambiguity, but not otherwise.”). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 238 illus. 1 (1932); Farnsworth, supra note 98, at
959 (“Under the older and more restrictive [view], parol evidence may only be used
for the purpose of interpretation where the language in the writing is ‘ambiguous’. . . .
This is the view adopted both by Williston and the Restatement of Contracts.”).
113. E.g., Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., No. 01-09-00728-CV, 2012 WL
1416558, at *10 (Tex. App. Apr. 5, 2013) (“whether they were oral or written”); Matthew v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 195 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Wis. 1972) (“[T]he parol
evidence rule precludes the introduction into evidence of any contemporaneous or
prior agreements, written or oral. . . .”); Sullivan v. United States, 244 F.Supp. 605,
617 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (“[M]anifest obligations provided thereby are not affected by
parol evidence of subjective intentions, inconsistent discussions, oral understandings,
and negotiations leading up to its execution.”).
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E. Extrinsic Evidence and Contract Interpretation
In Problem 2, a court that follows the Restatement could consider
the extrinsic evidence of trade usage to determine the meaning of the
word “daily.” The “reasonably intelligent person” who interprets terms of
a contract per Section 230 is a person “acquainted with all operative usages.”114 Thus, DJ’s evidence of trade usage can be used to interpret the
word “daily” regardless of whether there is an ambiguity.115 Why does the
Restatement discriminate between evidence of usage and evidence of
oral statements when interpreting the words of a contract? One possible
answer is that the former offers greater certainty of proof—there is a
greater certainty that the use of “daily” in janitorial services contracts
means Monday through Friday—and not seven days a week as suggested
by AB and DJ’s agreement.116 A stronger argument is that the Restatement takes an objective approach to contract interpretation, and trade
usage, unlike statements of the parties, is objective in nature.117 Trade usage comes from the practices of disinterested, reasonable persons.118 We
will next examine the Restatement Second’s treatment of the issues
raised by our two problems.

R
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114. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932). See also WILLISTON,
supra note 74, at 1748 (“[C]ontracts apparently clear in their meaning may be shown
by usage or the surrounding circumstances to be ambiguous. . . .”).
115. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 235(a)–(b) (1932); see also WILLISTON, supra note 74, at 1748 (“[C]ontracts apparently clear in their meaning may be
shown by usage or the surrounding circumstances to be ambiguous or perhaps clearly
to mean something different from the normal or ordinary meaning of their language.”). Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 illus. 2 (1932), with
Problem 2, supra Section I.
116. WILLISTON, supra note 74, at 1745 (“[A] reasonable degree of certainty is attained if words are interpreted according to a standard not peculiar to the parties, but
customary among persons of their kind under the existing circumstances.”). See also
Posner, supra note 48, at 559 (“Because admission of extrinsic evidence regarding
course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage is less likely than admission
of other forms of extrinsic evidence to result in judicial error, a more permissive
stance toward the former is justified.”).
117. BURTON, supra note 3, at 176 (“Trade usages and customs are objective
elements.”).
118. Cf. AM Int’l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Associates, Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir.
1995) (“By ‘objective’ evidence we mean evidence of ambiguity that can be supplied
by disinterested third parties: evidence that there was more than one ship called
Peerless. . . .”).
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IV. RESTATEMENT SECOND
In 1952, the ALI received a US$500,000 grant to underwrite the
costs of reexamining and revising the Restatements.119 At the ALI’s 30th
meeting in 1953, this project was announced as “Restatement Continued,” starting with the Restatements of Agency, Conflict of Law, and
Trusts.120 By the time the ALI’s reexamination and revision of the Restatement of Contracts began in 1962, the name of the project had been
changed to Restatement Second. Professor Robert Braucher121 of
Harvard was named as the Reporter, and Professor Arthur Corbin engaged to work as “Consultant.” In 1964, Professor Corbin provided the
following description of his work as a Consultant:
I at once proceeded to prepare a ‘one-man revision’ of the entire
Restatement. . . . I worked steadily on this for about 18 months,
covering the black letter sections, the comment[s] and illustrations. Many sections I rewrote entirely, especially Chapter 9 on
Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule. . . . Thus far, the Reporter has made steady use of my revision, although [he is] in no
respect bound to follow it.122

Understandably, contracts scholars have searched for a copy of Corbin’s
revision notes. Surprisingly, no law library has been able to find a copy,
and the ALI’s copy has apparently disappeared.123
In writing about the parol evidence provisions of the Restatement
Second, Dean John Murray concludes “the Restatement (Second) is

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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119. Minturn T. Wright III, The American Law Institute – Thirtieth Annual Meeting, 39 A.B.A. J. 580, 581 (1953).
120. What a meeting that must have been! A panel discussion of government investigation of communist activity featuring Abe Fortas and Bruce Bromley and “a concert which included Judge Learned Hand’s recent recording of two folk songs and
several renditions by Judge Augustus Hand in person.” Id. See Judge Billings Learned
Hand Singing Old English Song, YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=oJpblG8ctrU (you can hear Judge Learned Hand on YouTube).
121. See generally Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Preface: Robert Braucher and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 631–32 (1982).
122. Bibliography of the Published Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin, 74 YALE L.J.
311, 322 n.22 (1964).
123. See Scott D. Gerber, An Ivy League Mystery: The Lost Papers of Arthur Linton Corbin, 53 S.C. L. REV. 605 (2002); Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters From Arthur
L. Corbin to Robert Braucher, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 755, 755 (1993).
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clearly influenced by the criticisms of Professor Corbin”124—influenced,
but not controlled. According to Professor Braucher:
Professor Corbin went through all of this material, before I
started to work on it and made rather copious notes. . . . I had
started with the original formulation in the First Restatement, and
with Professor Corbin’s notes which left very little of the parol
evidence rule, and took, I think a ground that went somewhat
short of what Professor Corbin would have liked.125

Professor Braucher’s work as Reporter ended in 1971 when he was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Professor E. Allan Farnsworth of the Columbia University School
of Law succeeded Professor Robert Braucher as Reporter.126 Work on the
Restatement Second (Contracts) was largely completed during
Braucher’s term as Reporter.127 The ALI completed the Restatement Second in 1979. The Restatement Second was published in 1981.
Unlike the Restatement, the Restatement Second reflects the work
of more than just one man. The Restatement Second was influenced not
only by the work of Professors Williston, Corbin, Braucher, and Farnsworth, but also by the work of many other men and women that included
the ALI Council,128 the advisers appointed by the ALI Council, and ALI
members who participated in the fourteen ALI annual meetings at which

02/06/2014 10:11:19
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124. John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342, 1350
(1975).
125. Proceedings of 1971 Annual Meeting, 48 A.L.I. PROC. 442 (1971).
126. See generally Jean Braucher, E. Allan Farnsworth and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1420, 1421 (2005).
127. Robert Braucher, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of
Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 13, 13 (1981).
128. The ABI certificate of incorporation provides that the ALI’s managers shall
be called “councilors.” Certificate of Incorporation, ALI.ORG, (Jan. 17, 2013), http://
www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.charter. Professor Farnsworth describes the
work of the Council on the Restatement Second as follows: “The draft containing
revisions prompted by the Advisers, would be challenged anew when it was brought
before the Council, usually in December. The Council, some fifty to sixty eminent
lawyers, judges, and teachers of law, read the draft as generalists rather than specialists. . . . [T]he Council’s decisions . . . were binding on the Reporter.” E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1981). Judge Richard Posner has criticized the lack of age diversity on the Council. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 307 (1999) (“[T]he Institute should consider putting a term limit on
membership in the Council.”).
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129. See Jean Braucher, supra note 126, at 1422–24.
130. Justice Ellen Peters, Associate Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court (formerly a Yale Law professor) was an adviser for the American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. Ronald K.L. Collins, Gilmore’s Grant (or the
Life & Afterlife of Grant Gilmore & His Death), 90 NW. U. L. REV. 7, 22 n.103 (1995).
131. Jean Braucher, supra note 126, at 1424–25.
132. Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150
(1969).
133. Robert Braucher, supra note 127, at 13.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 cmt. a (1981).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 220, 221 (1981).
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the Restatement Second was discussed.129 The work of these men and women130 on the Restatement Second also took into account case law and
the Uniform Commercial Code.131 In 1967, Professor Herbert Wechsler
proposed what has become the ALI’s working formula for balancing considerations of what the law is with what the law should be: “We should
feel obliged in our deliberations to give weight to all of the considerations
that the courts, under a proper view of the judicial function, deem it right
to weigh in theirs.”132
The Restatement Second differs from the Restatement not only in
the preparation process but also in the nature of the final product. The
Restatement Second includes longer comments, more illustrations, and a
new feature, Reporter’s Note, which includes citations to cases and commentary. In a five page article that summarized the Restatement Second’s
treatment of parol evidence and usage, Professor Braucher wrote
“Changes in style and terminology have been freely made in the interest
of clarity and consistency; substantive changes have not been limited to
developments since the original Restatement; comments have been
expanded.”133
The Restatement Second is similar to the Restatement in many respects: it distinguishes parol evidence from usage, and questions of contract supplementation from questions of contact interpretation; it uses the
term “parol evidence rule” in the title of section but not in the text, and
treats “usage” in a separate topic from the parol evidence rule; it makes
clear that the parol evidence rule is not “a rule of interpretation; it defines the subject matter of interpretation”;134 and it treats the role of usage in supplementing an agreement and the role of usage in interpreting
an agreement in separate sections.135 With this background, let’s revisit
Problem 1 (our problem on contract supplementation) and then Problem
2 (our problem on contract interpretation).
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A. Parol Evidence and Contract Supplementation
Recall that in Problem 1, AB wants the court to consider evidence
of a parol agreement to add a time of performance term to a final written
contract. Using language that is clearer than the relevant Restatement
provisions, Restatement Second Section 216(a) provides that AB’s evidence of a parol agreement “is admissible to supplement” unless the written contract for janitorial services was “completely integrated.” Thus,
under the Restatement Second, like the Restatement, the court’s consideration of AB’s evidence of a parol agreement in Problem 1 would turn
on whether the final written contract was completely integrated. The two
significant changes effected by the Restatement Second’s parol evidence
provisions are: (1) whether an agreement is completely integrated is a
question “preliminary” to the application of the parol evidence rule to be
decided by the court,136 and (2) in deciding this preliminary question of
whether the agreement is completely integrated, the court can consider
parol evidence.137
Professor Braucher explained the changes at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute:

Thus, under Restatement Second Section 214, in contrast to the Restatement, AB’s parol evidence of an additional term can be considered by the
court for the limited purpose of determining whether the agreement is
completely integrated.139 The Restatement Second (or at least its Re-
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136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 (3) (1981).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (b). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. c (1981).
138. Proceedings of 1970 Annual Meeting, 47 A.L.I. PROC. 536–37 (1970).
139. “[T]he difficulties arise in determining whether . . . it is completely or only
partially integrated. . . . Those determinations are made in accordance with all relevant evidence, and require interpretation both of the integrated agreement and of the
prior agreement.” Robert Braucher, supra note 127, at 17. Perhaps this is an example
of what Professor Braucher had in mind with the statement “not limited to developments since the original Restatement.” Id. at 13.
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We have also added something which was not, I believe, in the
original Restatement, which is that this [the question of whether
there is a complete integration] is a question for the court. . . .
...
. . . The parol evidence rule is primarily a device to control jury
findings, dispensing power, and assist findings of fact. The safeguard here is that this is done by the judge as a preliminary question, and the determination whether there has been an integrated
agreement, and, if so, whether it’s complete or partial, is to be
made in the light of the entire context.138
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porter) abandons the Restatement’s four corners approach to determine
whether there has been a complete integration: “Now, you will still find
some cases where the court says that you look just at the document, its
four corners, but I don’t believe there is any court that can actually live
with that. The document does not prove itself.”140 It would seem that in
hearing AB’s evidence that there was an oral agreement about the time
of performance, the court would be more likely to conclude that a written
agreement silent as to time of performance was not a complete integration, unless the court chose to disbelieve AB’s evidence.
We need to use the “weasel word” “seem.”141 We can only specu142
late as to whether the Restatement Second effects a significant change
because no appellate court has expressly considered whether parol evidence as to an additional term, conclusively establishes that the writing
was not a complete integration. While conducting a search using “all
cases” in Westlaw’s database, we only found one case that even cites to
Restatement Second Section 214(b).143
B. Usage and Contract Supplementation
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140. Proceedings of 1970 Annual Meeting, 47 A.L.I. PROC. 537 (1970).
141. Rafael Palomino, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning, 2011
BYU L. REV. 657, 661 (2011) (“Friedrich von Hayek pointed out the perversion of
language in what he referred to as ‘weasel words,’ a phrase inspired by an old Norse
myth that attributes to the weasel an ability to suck out the contents of an egg without
breaking its shell. Hayek noted the possibility of emptying words of their content, or
of stripping them of their meaning, so that only the signifier remains.”).
142. Professor Williston similarly speculated. See WILLISTON, supra note 74, at
1820.
143. In re Sabertooth, LLC, 443 B.R. 671, 694 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).
144. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 219 (1981), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 (1981). Restatement Second adds a section on “course of dealing” and treats “course of dealing” essentially the same as
“usage.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1981).
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To supplement the janitorial service contract in Problem 1, DJ
would want the court to determine when work begins using the extrinsic
evidence of customary practice. Note that the use of parol evidence to
supplement the terms of a writing turns on whether the writing is a complete integration. In contrast, the use of other extrinsic evidence such as
trade custom to supplement a writing does not turn on whether the writing is a complete integration. The Restatement Second, like the Restatement, uses the term “usage,” rather than “trade usage” or “custom and
usage.” Further, the Restatement Second’s definition of “usage” is exactly the same as the Restatement’s definition of “usage.”144 The Restate-
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ment Second adds definitions of “usage of trade”145 and “course of
dealing,”146 but “usage” is the operative term in the Restatement Second’s
provision that governs whether usage can add a term to a written contract.147 Under the Restatement Second, as under the Restatement,
neither the section on usage that supplements an agreement148 nor the
illustrations thereunder make any mention of “complete integration.”
Like Illustration 10 to Restatement Section 246, Illustration 7 to Restatement Second Section 222 seems indistinguishable from Problem 1: “A
contracts to employ B for twenty days. In the kind of work to which the
employment relates, in the place where both reside and the work is to be
performed, a day’s work is eight hours. Unless otherwise agreed, B’s employment is for twenty, eight-hour days.”149 Therefore, in Problem 1, the
court could determine that work begins at 8 a.m.
Judge Braucher sees little difference between the Restatement and
Restatement Second with respect to use of usage to supplement a final
written contract. He summarizes the Restatement Second provisions on
“usage” as “reorganized and rephrased, but follows the original Restatement in substance.”150 The differences between the Restatement Second
and Restatement provisions on contract interpretation are more significant as described below.
C. Parol Evidence and Contract Interpretation
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145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 (1981).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1981).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 cmt. a (1981) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 cmt. a (1981) provide “[t]his Section . . . states
a particular application of the rules stated in section 220 [Usage Relevant to Interpretation] and Section 221 [Usage Supplementing An Agreement].”
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 (1981).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222, cmt. c, illus. 7 (1981).
150. Robert Braucher, supra note 127, at 17 (“Topic 4, ‘Scope as Affected by Usage,’ is reorganized and rephrased, but follows the original RESTATEMENT in
substance.”).
151. Hadjiyannakis, supra note 79, at 59.
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b (1981).
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Restatement Second Section 212 replaces Restatement Section 230.
Under Restatement Second Section 212, “all relevant evidence including
parol evidence is admissible on the issue of interpretation.”151 Unlike Restatement Section 230, Restatement Second Section 212 does not expressly require a finding of ambiguity before a court can consider “oral
statements by the parties of what they intended.”152 Unlike Restatement
Section 230, Restatement Second, Section 212 does not “take the objective viewpoint of a third person.” Rather the focus of Restatement Sec-
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ond Section 212 is on the meanings given by the parties.153 The “no
ambiguity requirement” and “look to what the parties intended” provisions of Section 212 are supported by other provisions of the Restatement
Second.154
For example, Section 214(c) provides that parol agreements can be
considered to establish “the meaning of the writing,”155 and under Section
201(1), a term in a written contract is to be given the meaning agreed to
both parties; neither Section 201(1) nor Section 214 requires a finding of
ambiguity.
The illustrations provided in Restatement Second Section 212 are
even more helpful. Consider Illustration 3: “A orally agrees with B, a
stockholder, that in transactions between them ‘abracadabra’ shall mean
X Company. A sends a written order to B to buy 100 shares of ‘abracadabra,’ and B buys 100 shares of X Company. The parties are bound in
accordance with the oral agreement.” If a court applies Restatement Second Section 212, it could consider evidence that the parties agreed that
“abracadabra” means “X Company.” It could then consider evidence in
Problem 2, and conclude that AB and DJ agreed that “daily” meant
every day.
D. Extrinsic Evidence and Contract Interpretation
Restatement (Second) Section 220 is entitled “Usage Relevant to
Interpretation.”156 Its only express limitation on a court’s consideration of
“usage” when interpreting the terms in a written contract, is the parties’
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153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a (1981) (“Interpretation
of contracts deals with the meaning given to language and other conduct by the parties. . . .”); see also Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence
Rule and its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195,
205 n.39 (1998) (“While the First Restatement excluded evidence of the parties’ intent
in favor of the judge’s view of a reasonable third party, the Second Restatement . . .
permits evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements and negotiations to . . .
explain the meaning of the writing.”). But c.f. Posner, supra note 48, at 570 (“Corbin’s
mistake is that, in assuming that the purpose of contract law is to enforce the intention of the parties, he overlooks the fact that the parties, in addition to their ordinary
contractual intentions, have intentions about how courts should evaluate their contract in case of a dispute.”).
154. And by case law and commentary. See C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall
Partners, 1991–NMSC–070, ¶ 15, n.3, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (1991) (“We hold
today that in determining whether a term . . . is unclear, a court may hear evidence of
. . . usage of trade . . . [i]n this regard, we join with the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. . . .”); BURTON, supra note 3, at 139 (“The best reading is that the Restatement (Second) does not require a finding of ambiguity. . . .”).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(c) (1981).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220 (1981).
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“know[ing] or [having] reason to know” of the usage.157 As Comment (d)
explains, “[l]anguage and conduct are in general given meaning by usage
. . . there is no requirement that an ambiguity be shown before usage can
be shown, and no prohibition against showing that language . . . [can]
have a different meaning in light of usage from the meaning they might
have apart from the usage.”158 The Restatement (Second) contains an illustration that is instructive to our Problem 2. The written contract provides: “A will buy and B will sell the rabbits at ‘60 £ per thousand.’ The
parties contract with reference to a local usage that 1,000 rabbits means
100 dozen. The usage is a part of the contract.”159 If a court applies the
Restatement (Second) to this illustration, it could look to usage and conclude that “1,000” means “1,200.” Similarly, with respect to Problem 2,
the same court could then look to usage and conclude that “daily” meant
Monday through Friday.
V. LEARNING FROM THE RESTATEMENT FIRST AND
THE RESTATEMENT SECOND

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
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Id. cmt. b.
Id. cmt. d.
Id. illus. 8.
BURTON, supra note 3 at 26.
See GORDON D. SCHABER & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 73 (West Publishing Co., 3d ed. 1990); Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts”
Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract
Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 777 (2009).
162. See BIX, supra note 52 at 61 (“Willistonian approach . . . with the First Restatement . . . Corbinian approach . . . incorporated in the Second Restatement”);
Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable From the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good
Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503, 518–19 (1991) (“differences between the Willistonian
(First Restatement) and Corbinian (Second Restatement) approaches to contract
interpretation”).
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The application of the Restatement and the Restatement Second to
our two problems highlights important differences in how these two
sources of law treat parol evidence, extrinsic evidence, the parol evidence
rule and contract interpretation. Law professors sometimes refer to the
Restatement’s provisions on parol evidence, extrinsic evidence, the parol
evidence rule and contract interpretation as “objective,”160 and the comparable Restatement Second’s provisions as “subjective.”161 Other law
professors have referred to the Restatement’s provisions as Willistonian,
and the Restatement Second’s provisions as Corbinian.162 Law professors
seem to refer to these sections of the Restatement and Restatement Second more than lawyers or judges which we think is regrettable. We urge
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courts to make greater use of the provisions and policies of the
Restatement.
As noted earlier, the questions raised by our two problems are questions that are regularly raised in reported cases. Too often in resolving
these questions, courts base their decisions on the use and misuse of the
terms “extrinsic evidence,” “parol evidence,” and the “parol evidence
rule,” rather than the relevant provisions and policies of the Restatement
or the Restatement Second.163 Nonetheless, both the Restatement and the
Restatement Second can be instructive to lawyers, judges, and law students164 in confronting questions of contract supplementation or contract
interpretation. Three165 important lessons can be drawn:
The first lesson from the Restatements relates to different questions.
Disputes between the parties to a final written contract over the meaning
of a term in that contract raise questions that are different from those
raised by disputes over the addition of a term to the final written contract. In Problem 2, our hypothetical on contract interpretation, the
threshold question is whether the word “daily” is ambiguous.166 Other
questions that flow from the main question are: how does a court determine whether the term “daily” is “ambiguous,” and if so, what does the
term “daily” mean?
Problem 1, our hypothetical on contract supplementation, raises different questions from that of Problem 2.167 When one party proffers evidence that prior agreements of the parties included a term missing from
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163. For example, a December 30, 2012 Westlaw search of the “all cases” databases
shows that 408 opinions mentioned the “parol evidence rule.” Only 13 of the 408
opinions even mentioned the RESTATEMENT or the RESTATEMENT (SECOND).
164. See, e.g., Roberta Cooper Ramo, The President’s Letter: A Farewell on the
Horizon, 35 THE ALI REPORTER 1, 2 (2012) (“I met with an NYU law-school class of
second- and third-year students. . . . When I asked how many of them used the Restatements . . . everyone in the class raised a hand. . . . I think it is also a reflection of
the need these days for law students to understand the law in more practical ways as
they face a world that expects more immediate legal competence from new graduates.
(Or, of course, they may have thought that part of their grade depended upon such an
amiable result.)”).
165. Remember the “rule of threes”? See WHAT IS A TRICOLON?, supra note 5.
166. Some would argue that this is not the threshold question because all words are
ambiguous. Leonard R. Jaffee, The Troubles With Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 777 n.6 (1992) (“Every good poet knows . . . [a]ll words, even those of just
one meaning, are ambiguous, because all symbols depend on the uncertain designs of
their makers and circumstances and the uncertain perceptions of both sayers and
receivers.”).
167. Kniffin, supra note 30, at 92 (“When interpreting a contract, a court therefore
has no reason to ask the set of questions designed to discover whether the parties
intended to add a separate term to their contract, under the parol evidence rule.”).
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168. Posner, supra note 48, at 570 (“The parol evidence rule excludes extrinsic evidence from consideration, while allowing the judge to rely on his or her personal
knowledge, even though the former, more so than the latter, would enable the court
to determine the parties’ intentions.”).
169. The Chief Justice of the New Wales Supreme Court, J. Spigelman, recently
compared the relative roles of text and context in contract interpretation in Australia,
China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand and United States. James
Spigelman, Contractual Interpretation: A Comparative Perspective, 85 AUSTRALIAN
LAW JOURNAL 412 (2011).
170. Linzer, supra note 2. See also William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and
the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
931, 947–53 (2001) (substituting “autonomy” and “efficiency” for text and context).
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the final written contract, there is no threshold question of whether a
term in the written contract is ambiguous. Indeed, the problem arises because there is no relevant term in the written contract. The threshold
question in Problem 1 is whether the writing is the final and complete
agreement between AB and DJ. If the writing is the final agreement, but
not the complete agreement, and the evidence of the additional terms is
an alleged earlier agreement, then other relevant questions arise. These
include: (1) was there in fact such an earlier agreement? (2) did the final
writing discharge the earlier agreement even though the two are not inconsistent? and (3) would the court prefer to make that earlier agreement
a part of the contract, or would it look to trade usage or fashion its own
term,168 or would it leave a gap in the contract?
The questions triggered by the evidence of usage are different from
the questions raised by the evidence of an earlier agreement. If in Problem 2, the writing is the final agreement but not the complete agreement,
and the evidence of the additional term is an alleged custom, then the
relevant questions include: (1) was there in fact such a custom? (2) did
AB and DJ know or have reason to know of the custom? and (3) is making that trade custom a term of the contract preferable to the court’s fashioning its own term or leaving a gap in that contract?
The second lesson to be drawn from the Restatements is balancing
text with context. The Restatement Second provides some different answers to the above questions from those provided by Restatement. The
answers under both sources, however, require a consideration and balancing of the relative importance of text and context.169 The Restatement
emphasizes text, giving greater weight to the written text when determining the threshold questions of whether the written contract is the complete and final agreement of the parties, and whether a term in that
written contract is ambiguous, while the Restatement Second looks more
into context. Some law review articles provide policy arguments that
favor a Restatement-like approach that gives greater weight to text.170
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These arguments tend to use the words “certainty” and “efficiency” and
“pragmatism.”171 Other law review articles provide policy arguments that
favor a Restatement Second-like approach that gives greater weight to
context.172 These articles tend to use the words “fairness” and “accuracy”
and “principled.”173
Of more interest are the law review articles that favor different approaches for different kinds of contracts.174 For example, Professor Eric
Posner argues that in “Ordinary Consumer Contracts,” “[t]he court could
sensibly admit extrinsic evidence that benefits buyers while excluding extrinsic evidence that benefits sellers, on the ground that sellers can put
relevant promises in writing more cheaply than buyers”175 while in “Complex Business Contracts” “[b]ecause of the large number of statements
made during preliminary negotiations, the number of statements outside
the contact is likely to be high. As a result of the idiosyncrasy of the
terms, erroneous judicial enforcement of some of these statements is
likely.”176 It is difficult to find an express consideration of these policy
arguments in reported cases. Instead, courts far too often simply attribute
rulings to the parol evidence rule or the plain meaning rule.177
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171. In this context, “certainty” and “efficiency” and “pragmatism” are “buzz
words” for the proposition that the more that arbitrators and judges involved in dispute resolution refer to matters other than text, the less certain the outcome and the
more expensive the process. See Linzer, supra note 2. See also Whitford, supra note
170.
172. Mooney, supra note 36.
173. “Fairness” or “accuracy” or “principled” in this context values determining
the actual intention of the actual parties. See Linzer, supra note 2, at 838. But cf.
Posner, supra note 48, at 570 (“[P]arties in addition in addition to their ordinary contractual intentions have intentions about how courts should evaluate their contract in
case of a dispute.”).
174. Professor Oman reminds us that the leading nineteenth century treatise on
contracts was organized around types of contracts (e.g., contracts with parish officers,
contracts for the purchase of real estate) rather than around general contract law
concepts. Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L. J. 77,
80–81 (2009). See also Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts Not
Under Seal, and Upon the Usual Defenses to Actions Theron (London, S. Sweet 1826).
More recently, in 2012, the American Law Institute began work on a new restatement
on contracts that will be limited to consumer contracts. Current Projects: Restatement
Third, The Law of Consumer Contracts, ali.org, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=25 (Jan. 18, 2013).
175. Posner, supra note 48, at 554.
176. Id. at 556.
177. E.g., Whitesell Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 496 F. App’x 551 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“According to the parol evidence rule, a court may not use extrinsic evidence to
interpret contract language that is unambiguous.”); Ruiz v. United States, 2012 WL
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The third and final lesson calls for the use of clear and simple vocabulary. The terms “parol evidence” and “extrinsic evidence” and “parol
evidence rule” are neither essential nor helpful to answer questions about
the terms of a written contract. These terms neither appear in the text of
the Restatement nor in the text of the Restatement Second. Clear and
simple language was a major objective of the American Law Institute.178
The Restatement Second’s phrase “prior agreements” is more transparent than the term “parol evidence.” It is clear that “prior agreements”
includes both oral agreements and written agreements and nothing else.
Similarly, the Restatement and Restatement Second’s use of the
term “usage” avoids the confusion that results from the courts’ use of the
term “extrinsic evidence,” or worse, “parol evidence.” It is clear that “usage” does not include prior agreements of the parties, and therefore
questions on whether usage fills a gap in a written contract or is helpful in
giving meaning to words in a written contract should not be based on the
parol evidence rule—a rule that is based on the proposition that a writing
supplants earlier agreements of the parties.
Finally, both the Restatement and the Restatement Second limit the
use of the term “parol evidence rule” to a parenthetical in section headings. Numerous professors have suggested that the parol evidence rule be
renamed as “‘contract supplementation’ or ‘contract variance’ rule”179 or
“Prior Negotiation Rule”180 or the “written contract exclusionary rule.”181
As Shakespeare said, “[t]hat which we call a rose / By any other
name would smell as sweet.”182 To question the use of a single rule to
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124442 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“Under the parol evidence rule a court . . . does not look to
extrinsic evidence to interpret the terms of an unambiguous written instrument.”).
178. Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization
for the Improvement of the Law, The American Law Institute 50th Anniversary 29
(1973) (addressing “the importance of expressing the [R]estatement in clear and simple English, avoiding so far as possible, the use of technical and unusual terms[,]” and
that “the [R]estatement should be understandable by an intelligent, educated person
who is not a trained lawyer.”).
179. Kniffin, supra note 30, at 102.
180. Burnham, supra note 1, at 97.
181. Daniel, supra note 26, at 261.
182. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act II, sc. ii. (“What’s in a name?
That which we call a rose / By any other name would smell as sweet.”). The senior
author opposed the use of this old saying as trite until it was pointed out that both
Harvard and Columbia publications included it in 2012, albeit in “secondary”
Harvard and Columbia journals. See Gary J. Simson, Religion By Any Other Name?
Prohibitions on Same Sex Marriage and the Limits of the Establishment Clause, 23
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 132 (2012); Robin West, A Marriage Is a Marriage Is a
Marriage: The Limits of Perry v. Brown, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 47 (2012). And, even
better, Nucky Thompson used it in the first season of Boardwalk Empire, Quotes:
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answer the various issues raised by our two problems is more important
than to question the name of the rule that resolves all issues raised by the
parties who reduce an agreement to writing. The inquiry should focus on
balancing the weight to be given to text with that to be given to context.
VI. CONCLUSION

C M
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Boardwalk Empire, tvtropes.org, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Quotes/
BoardwalkEmpire (January 18, 2013).
183. Promissory estoppel and third-party beneficiary are probably the two most
obvious examples of this mixture. See generally Joel M. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel:
The Legal History of an Ideal Legal Transplant, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 425 (2007);
Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985).
184. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 515
(2001) (“[F]all back on vague labels such as ‘aler ego’ or ‘lack of separation’ which has
been variously characterized as analysis by epithet and reasoning by perjorative.”).
Great phrase. Professor Bainbridge likes it so much that he used it again in three later
articles. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, How Do Judges Maximize?, 51 EMORY L. J.
83, 148 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 77, 98 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishop’s Alter Ego: Enterprise Liability and the Catholic Priest Sex Abuse Scandal, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 65, 97 (2007).
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From the beginning, the Restatements have been a blend of what
the law is and what the law should be.183 The Restatement of Contracts’
Chapter 9, “The Scope and Meaning of Contracts” is more a reflection of
what the Reporter thought courts should be doing than what courts were
actually doing in 1932. In substituting “Reporters” for “Reporter,” the
same is true of the corresponding provisions of the Restatement Second,
and of actions of courts in 1981. The same is also true of courts today.
Both the Restatement and the Restatement Second suggest that courts
should answer questions about adding terms to written contracts or interpreting terms in a written contract by balancing the weight given to text
with the weight given to context. The Restatement and the Restatement
Second disagree on principled bases about where this balance should be
drawn.
Instead of the reasoned analysis suggested by the Restatement and
the Restatement Second, courts too often use the terms “parol evidence,”
“extrinsic evidence,” and the “parol evidence rule” to “explain” decisions
and adopt an“[a]nalysis by epithet.”184 A court’s focus on labels rather
than on reasoning not only impedes law students’ understanding of what
the law is and how to answer questions on an exam, but also lawyers’
understanding of how to advise clients and how to present arguments to
arbitrators and judges. While we do not recommend that courts choose
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the Restatement over the Restatement Second or vice versa, we argue
that courts should increasingly look to the balancing of text and context
that is common to both of these sources of law.
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